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Abstract. The continuous growth in wireless devices connected to the Internet 
and the increasing demand for higher data rates put ever increasing pressure on 
the 4G cellular network. The EU funded H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” in-
vestigates a scenario architecture to cover the urban landscape for the upcoming 
5G cellular network. The studied scenario architecture combines multi-hop de-
vice-to-device (D2D) communication with network coding-enabled mobile 
small cells. In this scenario architecture, mobile nodes benefit from high trans-
mission speeds, low latency and increased energy efficiency, while the cellular 
network benefits from a reduced workload of its base stations. However, this 
scenario architecture faces various security and privacy challenges. These chal-
lenges can be addressed using cryptographic techniques and protocols, assum-
ing that a key management scheme is able to provide mobile nodes with secret 
keys in a secure manner. Unfortunately, existing key management schemes are 
unable to cover all security and privacy challenges of the studied scenario archi-
tecture. Certificateless key management schemes seem promising, although 
many proposed schemes of this category of key management schemes require a 
secure channel or lack key update and key revocation procedures. We therefore 
suggest further research in key management schemes which include secret key 
sharing among mobile nodes, key revocation, key update and mobile node au-
thentication to fit with our scenario architecture. 
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1 Introduction 
It has been almost a decade since the 4G mobile network was first introduced. Since 
that time, many more users and devices joined the network. Not only are our 
smartphones using the 4G network, but also the rapidly increasing number of devices 
within the Internet of Things (IoT) concept [1, 2]. Furthermore, since the introduction 
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of the 4G mobile network, the mobile data volume has risen immensely. It is expected 
that by 2021 the number of wireless devices connected to the network is 100 to 
10,000 [3] times higher, and the volume of mobile data is 1,000 times higher [3, 4]. 
This surge puts a lot of pressure on the current 4G network, which has to share its 
resources among the growing number of devices. This also causes a reduction in data 
rates and increases latency. 
To address these challenges, new technologies are emerging to create the next gen-
eration 5G network [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. These new technologies will deliver higher network 
capacity, allow the support of more users, lower the cost per bit, enhance energy effi-
ciency, and provide the adaptability to introduce future services and devices. It is 
envisioned that this new 5G network will be deployed by 2020 and beyond [3, 5, 6, 
10], with data rates reaching speeds going up to 10 Gb/s, and reduces the latency to 
delays as low as 1 millisecond end-to-end [10]. 
One approach of increasing throughput inside the 5G network is by utilizing net-
work coding. Network coding is an emerging network technology, which no longer 
treats data, moving through the network from sender to receiver, as commodities. 
Traditional routers inside a network can duplicate and forward incoming data packets, 
but network coding allows multiple packets at a router to be encoded together, before 
being forwarded. The concept of network coding was first introduced in [11]. It is an 
emerging communication paradigm that has the potential to provide significant bene-
fits to networks in terms of bandwidth, energy consumption, delay and robustness to 
packet losses [12, 13, 14]. 
Another emerging technology for the 5G network is small cells. The small cell 
technology is the most effective solution to deliver ubiquitous 5G services in a cost-
effective and energy efficient manner to its users. In particular, mobile small cells are 
proposed to cover the urban landscape and can be set up on-the-fly, based on demand, 
using mobile devices (i.e., user equipment) or Remote Radio Units (RRUs) [15]. 
Moreover, mobile small cells are networks consisting of mobile devices which are 
within relative close proximity to one another and thus, it allows device-to-device 
(D2D) communications that enable high data rate services such as video sharing, 
gaming and proximity-aware social networking. Consequently, end-users are provid-
ed with this plethora of 5G broadband services while the D2D communications im-
proves throughput, energy efficiency, latency and fairness [16, 17]. 
This paper investigates, in terms of security and privacy challenges, a scenario ar-
chitecture of the EU funded H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” [18] focused on secure 
network coding-enabled mobile small cells, and explores how existing key manage-
ment schemes can provide security and privacy in a similar architecture. This will 
form the basis for designing novel key management schemes that can support effi-
ciently and effectively existing and new integrity schemes against pollution attacks in 
network coding-enabled mobile small cells. The proposed schemes are expected to 
provide robust and low complexity key management including secret key sharing 
among mobile nodes, key revocation, key update, and mobile node authentication. 
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2 Scenario Architecture 
We present a scenario architecture of the EU funded H2020-MSCA project 
“SECRET” [18] focused on secure network coding-enabled mobile small cells. In this 
scenario architecture, the technologies of mobile small cells, network coding and D2D 
communications are combined, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The cellular network, consist-
ing of macro cells, is broken down into mobile small cells. Each mobile small cell is 
controlled by a hotspot (or cluster-head). This is a mobile node (device) within the 
cluster of mobile nodes that is selected to become the local radio manager to control 
and maintain the cluster. In addition, the hotspots of the different clusters are con-
trolled by a centralized software-defined controller. Through cooperation these 
hotspots form a wireless network of mobile small cells that have several gate-
ways/entry points to the mobile network using intelligent high-speed connections [19, 
20]. Data traffic between mobile nodes is established through D2D communications, 
and optimized by utilizing network coding. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scenario Architecture 
Suppose that a mobile node wishes to share a multimedia file with two other mobile 
nodes. The mobile node in possession of the multimedia file, the source node (SN), 
sends this file to the mobile nodes requesting the file, the destination nodes (DNs). 
Note that these mobile nodes are not required to be in the same mobile small cell, as 
illustrated in Fig. 1. Through D2D communications, the multimedia file – using mul-
tiple hops – is being routed by mobile nodes, through the network of mobile small 
cells from the SN to the DNs. 
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This architecture has multiple advantages, compared to the currently employed ar-
chitecture. By allowing multi-hop D2D communications through a network of mobile 
small cells, data traffic within this scenario is no longer required to be routed through 
the base station (BS). This means that the data is no longer required to travel the long 
distances to and from the BS, but has a more direct route. This significantly reduces 
latency. Since the transmissions travel shorter distances, the transmissions require less 
power to reach its destination. This means that this architecture also allows data 
transmission to be more energy efficient. This architecture also reduces the workload 
of the BS, which relieves stress on the cellular network. 
3 Security and Privacy Challenges 
The proposed architecture brings a set of new technologies together, and with that it 
also comes with a number of security and privacy challenges. This section will ex-
plore this kind of challenges that every individual technology poses in our proposed 
architecture. 
3.1 Multi-hop wireless network 
Allowing data packets in transmission to traverse multiple hops to reach the intended 
receiver, brings a spectrum of privacy threats. These privacy threats can be split into 
two categories, data privacy and identity privacy. Data privacy threats cover all at-
tacks in which the attacker tries to uncover information about the data transmitted to 
the intended receiver. The attacker uses techniques such as eavesdropping and identi-
ty impersonation. These attacks are well studied and various cryptographic techniques 
have been developed to prevent these attacks from being effective. These crypto-
graphic techniques are able to provide data confidentiality using data encryption 
schemes, entity authentication using identification schemes, and data authentication 
using signature schemes. These techniques counter all the aforementioned challenges. 
However, many of these countermeasures require both the sender and the intended 
receiver to be in possession of a shared cryptographic key. Thus, it is obvious that key 
management plays a critical role to achieve data privacy [21, 22]. 
Identity privacy is the other category of privacy threats in a multi-hop wireless 
network. The challenge of providing identity privacy lies in the establishment of se-
cure communication between two mobile nodes. To establish secure communication 
between two mobile nodes, both nodes are required to prove their identity to each 
other. This requirement prevents any attacker from using an impersonation attack. 
However, both mobile nodes wish to remain anonymous to the intermediate nodes 
routing the identifying information. This challenge can be solved with anonymous 
mutual authentication. With anonymous mutual authentication, both mobile nodes 
participate in an interactive zero-knowledge proof of identity protocol. This protocol 
involves exchanging challenges to prove their identity to each other, without actually 
sending any private identifying information. However, all zero-knowledge proof of 
identity protocols either require both mobile nodes to have a pre-established secret, or 
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depends on a Trusted Third Party (TTP). This TTP is a central control point that every 
node in the network trusts, but does not fit in our proposed architecture due to the lack 
of infrastructure. Both mobile nodes are therefore required to have a pre-established 
secret (such as a shared cryptographic key) in order to communicate [22, 23]. 
3.2 Network coding-enabled network 
A network coding-enabled network allows the encoding of data packets at routers 
inside the network, and decoding at the receiver’s end. This provides significant bene-
fits to networks in terms of bandwidth, energy consumption, delay and robustness to 
packet losses. Despite these tremendous advantages, networks utilizing network cod-
ing technology are vulnerable to the so-called pollution attack. In this attack, a mali-
cious adversary controls a router such that it can mutate data packets by introducing 
pollution in the original data packet. Network coding causes this pollution to spread 
downstream by encoding proper data packets with polluted data packets. This leads to 
the inability to properly decode and retrieve the information at the intended receivers. 
A successful pollution attack wastes a lot of costly network resources. The challenge 
posed by this attack is similar to the vulnerability of data modification in any wireless 
network. Data integrity is required to prevent any polluted data packets from being 
transmitted further through the network. The research community proposed various 
integrity schemes [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] to solve this problem. 
However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the integrity schemes are closely related 
to the key management schemes which are responsible for the generation, distribu-
tion, use and update of the cryptographic keys used by the integrity schemes. In the 
literature, there are various proposed schemes for key distribution which are used in 
network coding-enabled networks, but they suffer from drawbacks that limit their 
effectiveness and reliability [28, 29]. Therefore, it is of utmost importance the design 
of novel key management schemes that can overcome the limitations and drawbacks 
of the existing key management schemes in order to support efficiently and effective-
ly existing and new integrity schemes against pollution attacks in network coding-
enabled mobile small cells. 
3.3 Device-to-Device communications 
Device-to-Device (D2D) communications bring into the studied scenario architecture 
a number of security and privacy challenges. The sole introduction of D2D communi-
cations poses challenges when it comes to location privacy. Location privacy is a 
challenge, since data transmissions between mobile nodes requires close proximity. 
This allows colluding users to perform a boundary attack to locate nearby mobile 
nodes. One promising work [35] applied homomorphic encryption to privately identi-
fy whether friends are within a nearby distance without revealing the actual user iden-
tities. To find out the overall perception when it comes to location privacy, the Prince-
ton Survey Research Associates International held a survey in 2013 and found that 
46% of teen users and 35% of adults turn off location tracking features due to privacy 
concerns [36]. These privacy concerns need to be addressed so that users will allow 
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their devices to be discoverable and participate in content delivery through D2D 
communications. Fortunately, location privacy can be protected by using identity 
preserving techniques such as anonymous mutual authentication [22]. 
Furthermore, in combination with a multi-hop wireless network, D2D communica-
tions also brings data privacy challenges (e.g. eavesdropping) along with identity 
privacy (e.g. identity impersonation) and free-riding issues in the studied scenario 
architecture [22]. As previously discussed in Section 3.1, data privacy can be protect-
ed with the use of cryptographic techniques, where the role of key management is of 
utmost importance, whereas identity privacy can be protected by using techniques 
such as anonymous mutual authentication. In addition, free-riding means that a selfish 
mobile device is unwilling to send content to others, while it is still receiving de-
manded data, for the purpose of saving energy. Free-riding reduces fairness and 
transmission availability within the network. Thus, a stimulating cooperation mecha-
nism is necessary to prevent free-riding within the network, and several solutions 
have been proposed to solve this problem [37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. 
3.4 Mobile small cells 
The introduction of mobile small cells in the studied scenario architecture makes the 
network dynamic. Every mobile node inside the network is allowed to constantly be 
on the move. Certain mobile nodes could leave the macro cell, and other mobile 
nodes could join the macro cell. This network therefore has a constantly changing 
topology and thus, it poses a problem when it comes to key management. Traditional 
certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC) relies on a trusted third party 
called a certifying authority (CA). The CA issues certificates to users inside the net-
work. These certificates are used to verify the identity and provide a cryptographic 
key at the same time. This CA can be interpreted as the key manager, and it is a cen-
tral control point that every node in the network trusts. However, a CA does not fit in 
the studied scenario architecture due to the lack of infrastructure [42, 43]. On the 
other hand, identity-based public key cryptography (IB-PKC) removes the require-
ment of certificates, since public keys in IB-PKC are equal to the identity of the mo-
bile nodes. However, private keys are obtained from the Key Generation Center 
(KGC). KGC holds a master key from which it generates private keys. Consequently, 
a compromised KGC means that the entire system is compromised. This means that 
IB-PKC suffers from a single point of failure, along with the key escrow problem 
[44]. Finally, certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is introduced to solve 
these issues. With CL-PKC, private keys are constructed by both the KGC and the 
mobile user requesting the private key. The KGC generates the first part of the private 
key, and the mobile user completes the private key by combining it with his own pri-
vate key. The tasks of the KGC can be distributed among mobile nodes using verifia-
ble secret sharing [45]. A compromised KGC using CL-PKC only provides the at-
tacker with partial private keys. CL-PKC not only solves the single point of failure 
and the key escrow problem, but it can also satisfy the dynamic topology of the net-
work. Certificateless key management schemes therefore seem a good candidate for 
the studied scenario architecture, however many proposed schemes still suffer from 
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the private key distribution problem, or they lack key update or key revocation proce-
dures. 
4 Cryptographic Security Solutions 
Having explored the challenges which are brought forth by the studied scenario archi-
tecture, this section discusses how these challenges can be solved. By allowing our 
scenario architecture to perform multi-hop D2D communication, a spectrum of securi-
ty and privacy challenges arise. However, cryptographic techniques and anonymous 
mutual authentication are able to provide secrecy and anonymity. Parties wishing to 
communicate securely require a shared cryptographic key to take advantage of the 
cryptographic techniques and anonymous mutual authentication. Key management 
schemes are responsible for the generation, distribution, storage, use, revocation, and 
update of these cryptographic keys. It is therefore important to investigate the design 
of novel key management schemes that fit with our scenario architecture and provide 
all these functionalities in an efficient and effective manner. 
Moreover, to fully exploit the advantages of network coding in our scenario archi-
tecture, novel key management schemes are required as most of the existing ones are 
not able to fully support the data integrity schemes proposed in the literature to pre-
vent pollution attacks in network coding–enabled networks. 
In addition, the security of mobile small cells is also affected by key management. 
The dynamic topology that mobile small cells bring to our scenario architecture poses 
the challenge of a suitable family of key management schemes. As discussed, CB-
PKC and IB-PKC, and their respective key management schemes are not suitable. On 
the other hand, CL-PKC and certificateless key management schemes seem to be a 
good candidate. However, existing certificateless key management schemes either 
lack key update or key revocation procedures, or they require a safe channel for (par-
tial) key distribution which is difficult to realize in our scenario architecture [43]. 
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to design novel (certificateless) key man-
agement schemes for our scenario architecture. These schemes should provide robust 
and low complexity key management including secret key sharing among mobile 
nodes, key revocation, key update and mobile node authentication. Finally, they 
should also support existing and new integrity schemes against pollution attacks in 
network coding-enabled mobile small cells in an efficient and effective manner. 
5 Conclusion 
The studied scenario architecture is suitable to cover the urban landscape of high 
speed 5G mobile communication. This new scenario architecture exploits the ad-
vantages of D2D multi-hop communication and network coding-enabled mobile small 
cells. However, combining these technologies come with security and privacy chal-
lenges. For each technology, we explored their respective security and privacy chal-
lenges. We found that there are solutions against the identified security and privacy 
challenges assuming that there exists a key management scheme able to support cryp-
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tographic techniques and protocols in an efficient and effective manner. However, no 
key management schemes seem to exist which satisfy all the requirements necessary 
to support all cryptographic techniques and protocols to ensure security and privacy in 
our scenario architecture. It is therefore of the utmost importance the design of novel 
key management schemes that can provide robust and low complexity key manage-
ment including secret key sharing among mobile nodes, key revocation, key update, 
and mobile node authentication. 
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